

65 PROSPECT PARK,  
NEWTONVILLE 60, MASS.

Dear Allen, <sup>Rec'd</sup> 8/19/46  
Some idle  
thoughts - throw them  
in the waste-basket  
when read but I do  
feel the Civil Service  
Blight will kill any  
serious Agency if allowed  
to have anything to  
do with it  
Stan Lovell

From Mr. Lovell's Desk

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1. It should be under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was the idea tried by the Office of Strategic Services. It did succeed in giving that Agency a certain jealous equality with G-2 and O.N.I., but only at the high price of making O.S.S. a military organization. No military foreign intelligence bureau can possibly succeed.
  2. It should be under the Secretary of State. No continuity; often several Secretaries in a four year term. Antagonism of other Cabinet officers and of the military is inevitable.
  3. It should be under the President. On first inspection, this idea has much to commend it. Since the Chief Executive is alone responsible for the Bureau, it may well be efficient, quickly responsive to changes in policy, and nicely maintained at a point of high esprit. But the President must get the appropriations for the Agency from the Congress. Many times in our history the Executive and Congress have been hostile, or at least unsympathetic. At such times the Agency would be "cut back" without mercy or reason. Again, there may arise a President who, ambitious to hold that office for life, would employ it for personal ends. Dictators always ride into power on emergencies and no better purveyor of emergencies exists than a world-wide system of intelligence. Finally, the sole right to declare war resides with the Congress, not with the Executive. Since a declaration of war depends on factual information regarding enemy potential and enemy intention, this Agency is a war determinant not proper to be controlled by the President.
  4. It should be under the Joint Foreign Affairs Committee of the Congress. As a result of our seniority system, the Chairmen and many members of this committee have actually longer tenures in office than has any President, Cabinet Officer or military official. The appropriation of public money for the Agency, which would be very large and mostly unvouchered, would be far easier to secure in secrecy if the Agency were the creature of Congress. Since 1930, every revision of our Federal Government has strengthened the Executive Branch at the expense of the Legislative and Judicial Branches. So powerful an Agency as this could well become in a decade or two, should be so placed that the balance may be partly, at least, thrown back toward the Legislative Branch. Since no one can now define "military intelligence" as distinguished from "scientific intelligence", a new level of liason or authority must be set up between this Agency and A.E.C., G-2, O.N.I. and F.B.I. Somewhere there must reside top policy and top authority, otherwise we will have operators swarming over one another. Such final authority cannot be vested in the F.B.I. nor in the military services. Since the Directive of this Agency would charge it with having fore-knowledge of the intentions and the potential of all world powers, it is logical to place top intelligence authority with it, that it may have full command over all other intelligence agencies, civilian and military, in carrying out its vital mission.
- The Chief of this Agency and his immediate Deputies must be selected and confirmed in secret. If the appointment becomes debated in either open or closed sessions he becomes a political football (cf. David Lilienthal) and his usefulness is lessened at the start. His salary and that of his deputies must be exempted by law from all income taxes of Federal, District or State Treasuries; otherwise his financial status is on view to every auditing clerk and the top-quality men will not be attracted to the position. The appointment must be for ten years with retirement at age 65 on liberal pension. The Agency will not be built to efficient status in ten years, but at least that spans over two administrations.
- The entire establishment must be outside the Civil Service. The Bureau of Printing and Engraving, operating under Civil Service, and engaged in the most secret and confidential work, nevertheless has over a dozen trade-unions strongly entrenched in it. Any one of them can call a strike at will and all can enter and view the most classified work, in order to establish piece rates and to regulate other union matters. The whole spirit of the Civil Service, where personal pay depends upon the number of subordinates, is utterly hostile to an intelligence office. This Agency must be set up by the Congress as a thing apart and with a deep appreciation of the tremendously vital part it must play in maintaining the very life of our Republic.

Stanley P. Lovell  
65 Prospect Park  
Newtonville, 60  
Massachusetts.